Abstract-Model-free decentralized optimizations and learning are receiving increasing attention from theoretical and practical perspectives. In particular, two fully decentralized learning algorithms, namely Trial and Error Learning (TEL) and Optimal Dynamical Learning (ODL), are very appealing for a broad class of games. Indeed, ODL has the property to spend a high proportion of time in an optimum state that maximizes the sum of the utilities of all players, whereas, TEL has the property to spend a high proportion of time in an optimum state that maximizes the sum of the utilities of all players if there is a pure Nash equilibrium, otherwise, it spends a high proportion of time in a state that maximizes a trade-off between the sum of the utilities of the players and a predefined stability function. On the other hand, estimating the mean fraction of time spent in the optimum state (as well as the mean time duration to reach it) is challenging due to the high complexity and dimension of the inherent Markov chains. In this article, under some specific system model, an evaluation of the above performance metrics is provided by proposing an approximation of the considered Markov chains, which allows overcoming the problem of high dimensionality. A comparison between the two algorithms is then performed which allows a better understanding of their performance.
Ç

INTRODUCTION
G AME Theory and more generally decentralized optimization has recently received increasing attention from theoretical and practical perspectives. For instance, several classes of games have been studied and characterization of the corresponding equilibria has been performed [1] , [2] . On another hand, developing learning based methods that can be implemented in a distributed way by the agents is of paramount importance in decentralized optimization and game frameworks. These methods must either converge to an equilibrium, in game contexts, or to a local/global optimum in the context of decentralized optimization. One can refer to [1] for a survey on learning based methods.
In most cases, it is assumed that the utility function of the users and the action set have some mathematical properties (e.g., Lipschitz continuity of the reward, etc.) to ensure the convergence of developed methods.
In practice, the optimization/game frameworks can however be very complex, in which the utility function may not have a closed form expression and even may take discrete values. In such contexts, model-free strategy learning algorithms are very appealing approaches [3] . Players neither try to model the environment nor try to have a specific/ explicit utility form. They simply consider the environment as a black box and learn by interactions (e.g., Trial and Error (TE)). This context, though very restrictive, can be encountered in a wide variety of examples. For instance, in a wind farm, each turbine controls the power that it extracts from the wind [4] . It is very difficult, if not intractable, to model the impact of a turbine on other turbines. In addition, the lack of communications between them makes impossible any cooperation. Another example is the case of commuters in city that want to avoid traffic jams but, they neither know the strategies of other commuters nor the impact of their strategy on the achieved rewards [5] . In the context of wireless telecommunication systems, decentralized resource allocation can be encountered in many contexts since the nodes/ players may not be able to exchange information between each other in order to not increase the overhead in the network. Also realistic utility functions of the users may not have closed form expression (e.g., Quality of Experience, number of correctly decoded packets, etc.). Decentralized resource allocation approaches have been widely used in wireless networks, e.g., to share the resources among femtocells or wifi access points [6] , [7] . In ad hoc networks, the network is infrastructure-less which makes decentralized learning solutions suitable in such contexts [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] .
In model-free resource allocation schemes, developing decentralized strategies that converge to an equilibrium (if it exists), or at least finding conditions under which they converge, represents a main challenge [3] . The TE algorithms, proposed in [4] , [12] and then applied to various resource sharing problems e.g., [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , are very appealing in these contexts. They show the particularity to exhibit cooperative convergence properties in a broad class of games. For this reason, the focus in this paper is on TE algorithms. For instance, the Optimal Distributed Learning (ODL) algorithm, developed in [4] , has the property to spend a high proportion of time in an optimum state that maximizes the sum of the utilities of all players whether there is, or not, a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE). On the other hand, the Trial and Error Learning (TEL) algorithm, proposed in [12] , has the property to spend a high proportion of time in an optimum state that maximizes the sum of the utilities of the players if there is a PNE, otherwise, it spends a high proportion of time in an optimum state that maximizes a trade-off between the sum of the utilities of the players and a predefined stability function. Even though the above two algorithms converge to a desired state, their convergence rates remain an open question [3] , [12] . The main reason comes from the computation complexity of the inherent Markov Chain (MC) generated by these two algorithms. In fact, the game in which players employ these learning schemes can be represented by Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) with huge number of states. Obtaining the transitions matrix of these MCs is therefore not tractable which makes the analysis of the convergence rate not possible (even numerically).
The main contributions of this work are fourfold. We are interested in computing the mean time these algorithms spend in a desired state as well as the mean time required to achieve that state under a given model. Due to the huge dimension of the MCs, only approximations can be employed to compute a close approximation of the aforementioned convergence metrics. The first contribution is to provide an approximation of the MC associated to the TEL algorithm. The second contribution is to provide such an approximation for the ODL algorithm. In addition, we explain the methodology to obtain them. To the best of our knowledge, a first attempt to analyze the convergence rate of TEL in a practical context was addressed in [9] . However, the analysis provided in this paper provides a better approximation (as one will see in the sequel). In addition, no attempt has been made to analyze the convergence properties of ODL. Third, using numerical results, we derive the convergence properties of each algorithm. Last, this allows us to provide a comparison between these two algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this comparison has never been addressed under a practical system model before.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the system model along with a brief description of TEL and ODL. Section 3 summarizes the main results of this work. The detailed performance analysis (i.e., mean convergence time to a desired state and mean time spent in that state), including the reduction of the MCs, is provided in Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7. Numerical results are provided in Sections 8 and 9 concludes the paper.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a network/set of K players K ¼ f1; . . . ; Kg, that interact among each other. The players share a discrete set of resources denoted by N ¼ f1; . . . ; Ng. In this paper, to avoid confusion between multiple indexes, we will use the notation r i to denote resource number i (i.e., r i ¼ i and the notation r i is used only to make clear that we refer to a resource in the set N ). Each player k chooses an action a k , which consists of selecting a resource inside the set N without exchanging any information with the other players. The action of each agent takes hence integer values between 1 and N. In this paper, we will use also the notation a k ¼ r i to mention that the action of player k is to select resource r i . The vector a ¼ ða 1 ; . . . ; a K Þ 2 A represents the system action, where A ¼ N K . The utility received by each player k 2 K is u k ðaÞ, and uðaÞ ¼ ðu 1 ðaÞ; . . . ; u k ðaÞÞ is the system vector utility. When two players choose the same resource they will interfere with each other. We assume that the utility can take binary values (i.e., u 2 f0; 1g K ). It is important to note that players are not aware of the utility model. Each agent observes, at each algorithm iteration, the numerical value of its own utility and makes an action depending on this value, according to algorithms described later on in the current section, without knowing the mathematical form of the utility function. The algorithms employed by the agent to update their actions falls therefore into the category of model-free optimization. In addition, note that, such a hard binary utility model is commonly encountered in the literature [8] , [10] , [13] . For instance, in telecommunication networks users share resources and the communication quality for each user can be measured in term of number of information packets that are transmitted with no errors. If a packet is transmitted correctly the perceived utility is 1 otherwise it is 0, and the agents are interested in transmitting the maximum number of packets. It is worth mentioning that, in radio communications, a packet is correctly transmitted or delivered to the receiver, and hence the utility is equal to 1, if the Signal to Noise ratio at the receiver is above a given threshold [8] , [13] . Otherwise the transmission of the packet is considered to be failed and the utility is equal to 0. One can cite also other examples where the utility takes only two values 0 and 1. For instance, one can define the utility function as the quality of experience/service in a telecommunication network where the agents (or the users) are using video or audio services. These services require that each agent transmit a minimum number of bits needed by the application. If the number of bits is less than a predefined threshold, the quality of service (or of experience) of the users will be bad. One can then define the utility function as the indicator if the quality of experience (or of service) is good or bad. Consequently, the utility is equal to 1 if the amount of transmitted bits is above a given threshold and 0 otherwise [10] . This problem can be modeled as a normal form game G ¼ ðK; A; fu k g k2K Þ. A common approach to solve the aforementioned problem is to study the PNE that can be defined as follows.
where a k is the term k of a Ã and a Ã Àk is the vector of all terms in a Ã except a k .
Since we consider a general game model, we make some assumptions in the sequel in order to ensure the existence of a PNE. We suppose that the number of available resources N is greater or equal to the number of players K. Furthermore, we assume that if two players interfere with each other (i.e., they choose the same resource) then their utilities are equal to 0. The utility of a player is then equal to 1 when no other player chooses the same resource. These simplified assumptions can be justified by the fact that our objective in this paper is to study the performance of TEL and ODL algorithms and not to study the existence of PNE for some game models. It is worth mentioning that even under the above assumptions the problem is still challenging due to the fact that the players cannot communicate with each other and then, they cannot be aware of the other players' actions, but they can only observe the result of their own actions (e.g., a player cannot know how many players have chosen the same resource). The resulting Markov chain, as one will see in the sequel, is very complex to analyze under this model.
In order to deal with the aforementioned decentralized resource allocation problem, two fully distributed learning schemes, namely TEL and ODL, can be employed. They have received increasing attention recently, which leads us to analyze their performance and make a comparison between them in this paper. In the remaining of this section, a description of these algorithms is provided. Both algorithms share common characteristics. Each player k 2 K implements a controller composed with states called moods and noted m k and, m ¼ ðm 1 ; . . . ; m K Þ is the mood vector of the network. In TEL, there are four moods called Content (C), Watchful (W), Hopeful (H) and Discontent (D), whereas ODL controller is solely composed of two moods C and D. For both algorithms states C and D have a similar understanding. In state C, the agent is satisfied by the current state and search a better performance very slowly (it experiments but this happens with low probability as one can see in the algorithms description). In state D, the agent is discontent since the previous action leaded to a decrease in its performance. An agent in this state D wishes to leave the current state and will experiment to move fast to a new state. Both states H and W, observed in the TEL, are intermediary states that help stabilizing the set of agents to converge to Nash Equilibriums (NEs). When sudden variations of the utility are observed the state of the agent goes to an intermediary watchful state W if this variation is a decrease of the utility value and to a hopeful state H if it is an increase of the utility value. In these states there are no experiments. The system can be stabilized contrary to the ODL algorithm in which an agent can goes directly from a slow search in C to a very random search in D suddenly. More details on the role of these states are presented in the sequel and also in [5] , [12] . In order to detect the variations of the utility, each agent k keeps in memory a reference utility called benchmark utility denoted u k . Furthermore, each player has also a benchmark action denoted by a k in order to try a new action when necessary as one can see in the description of the algorithms in the sequel. These benchmark changes are specific to each algorithm and play a central role in their convergence. Intuitively, these changes enable each agent to keep track of their perception of the state of the environment. The benchmark values are updated by each agent according to the rules defined in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. The benchmarks of the network are then denoted by a ¼ ð a 1 ; . . . ; a K Þ and u ¼ ð u 1 ; . . . ; u K Þ. At each iteration, every player either selects to use the benchmark action (i.e., a k ¼ a k ) or decides to try a new one a k 6 ¼ a k . Then, the player observes the obtained utility u k and compares it to its benchmark utility u k . Detailed descriptions of both algorithms, including the rules used to define/update the benchmark actions and utilities, are provided in the sequel.
TEL
This section describes the rules applied in the TEL controller proposed in [12] for any k 2 K: 
N , 8r i 2 N ) with probability 1. The next state m k changes to C with probability F ðu k Þ , where F ðuÞ ¼ Àf 1 u þ f 2 with, f 1 > 0 and f 2 such that 0 < FðuÞ < 1=2K, with a benchmark update (i.e., u k u k and a k a k ). Otherwise, m k ¼ D with probability 1 À F ðu k Þ .
ODL
This section describes the rules applied in the ODL controller proposed in [4] for any player k 2 K: m k ¼ C, there are two cases to consider: 1) with probability 1 À c , where c > K is a real constant, then a k ¼ a k . If u k 6 ¼ u k then the state m k changes to D with probability 1 À 1Àu k . Otherwise, with probability 1Àu k , the cluster updates its benchmark (i.e., u k u k ) and remains in C. 2) with probability c > 0, a new action is experimented, a k 2 N nf a k g. The new action is selected randomly in the set N nf a k g. If u k 6 ¼ u k , the state m k changes to D with probability 1 À 1Àu k . Otherwise, with probability 1Àu k , the cluster updates its benchmark (i.e., u k u k and a k a k ) and remains in C. m k ¼ D: an action a k is randomly chosen among N . The cluster switches to C with probability 1Àu k and updates its benchmark (i.e., u k u k and a k a k ), otherwise with probability 1 À 1Àu k , it remains in D.
Markov Chain Representation and Performance Metrics
The different states taken by the network are defined by z ¼ ðm; a; a; u; uÞ and represent a MC noted X TEL if TEL is used by all players or noted X ODL if ODL is used. Unless there is an ambiguity, we drop the indices and call the MC X.
The convergence performance of TEL and ODL are evaluated along two features: i) the mean time duration to reach the state maximizing the sum of the utilities of all players, starting from a specific initialization point, also known as Expected First Hitting Time (EFHT) and denoted by T EFHT , ii) the mean fraction of time duration spent in that state denoted by a. The sum of the utilities of all players is also called the social welfare.
It is of interest to note that these algorithms are known to converge under the interdependence property (see [4] , [12] for the exact definition). In few words, the interdependence is the property that for any set of players, there exists an action that changes the utility of a player that is not in the set. This condition is a sufficient condition as the analysis in [4] , [12] was done for more general game model than the one considered in this paper. In our case, the above condition is not needed. In fact, thanks to the presence of the small probability in TEL and ODL (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), all states of the Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) X communicate and form a unique communication class. X is then ergodic and possesses a unique invariant distribution. This property ensures a non null transition probability between all states for a sufficient number of transitions and a non null probability of the corresponding state. In this paper, we are interested in computing the mean time the system stays in a desired state and the mean time needed to achieve that state for the first time. The desired state is the one that maximizes the social welfare of the players.
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we provide a summary of the main contributions and results obtained in this paper. Observations and conclusions obtained and presented in Section 8 will be briefly summarized in this section as well. The main result of this work is to provide an efficient approximation of the MC for TEL and ODL algorithms that allow an accurate numerical convergence analysis. The approximated MC is denoted by e X. In the next sections, we describe the procedure to approximate and reduce the MC dimensionality so as to realize the convergence analysis. It is worth mentioning that the number of states in the original MC is huge, which makes very hard the computation (even numerically) of the performance metrics T EFHT and a for both algorithms.
Using the proposed efficient approximation, we are able to find interesting results (that are presented in Section 8). Based on the obtained results, the following two observations can be highlighted. We use the Landau notation Oð:Þ to specify the rate of convergence when K becomes important or when is close to 0 but strictly positive. In this notation, K and are dropped for clarity. From these observations, some interesting comparisons can be deduced. Both algorithms have a convergence time inversely proportional to and a stability that decreases polynomially with . However, ODL has the logarithm of the convergence time increasing with a power of K greater than 1 whereas, for TEL it increases linearly with respect to K. At low K, the convergence time of ODL is relatively similar to the TEL one, but at higher K, TEL converges faster than ODL. In addition, for ODL, the stability decreases exponentially with respect to K whereas, for TEL, the stability decreases polynomially. It follows that TEL is much more stable than ODL. For small number of players, the convergence time of both algorithms are similar but the stability of TEL is better. For higher number of players, TEL performs better than ODL for both convergence metrics. These observations result from the analysis of the figures of merit computed using the formulas presented in the next sections.
Observation 1. For TEL, the EFHT T EFHT ¼ Oð
METRICS COMPUTATION
In this section, we present how to compute the figure of merit of both algorithms using the transition matrix P 0 of the DTMC X. The method is based on introducing the generalized fundamental matrix F for ergodic MCs developed in [14] . The matrix F, which is an extension of the fundamental matrix introduced in [15] , is defined by
where I is the identity matrix, 1 is a column vector filled with 1, and b is any arbitrary column vector. In [14] , the only requirement is to select b such that it verifies the condition b t 1 6 ¼ 0. The role of term 1b t is to make the matrix ðI À P 0 þ 1b t Þ invertible. The reason to focus on this specific matrix is due to the fact that it is observed that a term of the form ðI À P 0 Þ À1 plays an important role in the computation of quantities such as the EFHT and the stability [15] . Unfortunately, in the case where P 0 is irreducible and its spectrum is 1, ðI À P 0 Þ is not invertible. Therefore, the term 1b t is added to recover a similar matrix which is invertible. It is interesting to note that the value of b does not influence the computation of important quantities such as the EFHT and the stationary distribution [14] and, its impact is just to make sure that F exists (for more details one can refer to [14] ). To prove the existence of F, it was shown in [15] that the only solution to
is x ¼ 0 if b t 1 6 ¼ 0, which is the requirement to use F. The first feature that we compute using F is the EFHT to a given state j from a state i, noted t ij which is given by ( [14] Equation (30))
where F ij is the term in line i and column j of matrix F, and p p j is the stationary probability of state j. The stationary distribution p p of P 0 can be obtained using the matrix F as well and we describe the procedure afterwards. First, note that p p is composed of strictly positive components that verify
Therefore, according to the definition of F, we can write
Multiplying the previous equation by p p
which is provided in [14] . In this work, we choose b ¼ 1 which meets the requirement 1 t b 6 ¼ 0. The second feature that describes the performance of stochastic stable algorithms is the mean fraction of time spent in the state that maximizes the social welfare. In an ergodic MC, the proportion of time a j spent in a state j is equal to its stationary probability a j ¼ p j ([15] Theorem 4.2.1) which corresponds to the jth component of p p in (5) .
The convergence analysis realization requires the manipulation of transitions matrices. The huge number of states S grows exponentially with K and N (see Section 6.3) and since X's transition matrix has dimension ðS Â SÞ, it needs to be approximated to allow numerical computation of the performance. As an example, even for small values N ¼ K ¼ 3, the number of states is already S ¼ 373; 248. In this work, we propose a new approach to build the approximated DTMC e X whose transition matrix is denoted by P. Note that the approximation e X is built such that it is ergodic like X which means that P admits a unique invariant distribution with strictly positive components. With this approximation, formulas (3) and (5) are still valid if P 0 is replaced by P. It remains to construct P with justified and motivated arguments. This approach follows in three steps: i) Due to the huge number of states, we focus on those in which TE based algorithms spend a high proportion of time, ii) we then gather these states by identifying invariances induced by the resource allocation problem and the utility model, iii) finally, in order to provide an ergodic matrix to compute the performance metrics, based on the gathered states in step (ii) we describe further transitions and states to create a MC with the desired property. The latter is an approximation as it contains a subset of states of the initial MC X.
Then, from the probability transition matrix of the approximated MC, we are able to compute the two figures of merit.
REDUCING THE MARKOV CHAIN DIMENSIONALITY
The huge size of the state space of X prevents the enumeration and description of all states, which implies that the standard tools of model analysis and/or model-size reduction may be applied. Therefore, in order to build approximations of X, we start by only considering the states called recurrence classes of the unperturbed process [16] , denoted by recurrence classes (RC), that were used as the key feature for the TEL and ODL proof of convergence. The principle of starting the reduction by analyzing the RC of the MC can be justified as follows. These states can be seen as the resting point of the process, in which the system spends a high amount of time. Thus, they play a major role in the performance metrics. The reason of this importance in any regularly perturbed MC comes from the combination of two properties. First, the network needs at least one experimentation to leave an RC, which occurs with small probability . Second, by definition [16] , the network always naturally goes to an RC when no perturbation occurs. In this work, these states are characterized by m ¼ m C :¼ ðC; C; . . . ; CÞ, a ¼ a, and u ¼ u, i.e., all the players are in the content mood and aligned (i.e., a ¼ a, and u ¼ u). We denote by R the set of these states. We can also drop some notations and rewrite a state z ¼ ðm C ; a; a; u; uÞ 2 R as z ¼ ð a; uÞ However, the number of RC is so large that we need to find a way to gather them. We first realize that permuting the resources does not affect the repartition of the utility values among agents. For instance, let consider a network with three players and three resources z 1 ¼ ððr 1 ; r 2 ; r 1 Þ; ð0; 1; 0ÞÞ 2 R. Players 1 and 3 have null utility because they use the same resource. If we change the resource label 1 with label 3 and, label 2 with label 1, z 1 becomes z 2 ¼ ððr 3 ; r 1 ; r 3 Þ; ð0; 1; 0ÞÞ which has the same repartition of utility. As such, we can deduce that it does not change the "global" performance of the network. The later invariance is true in other resource allocation problems as long as there is orthogonality between resources (two agents do not interfere as long as they use different resources).
Then, we also note that due to the utility model, permuting the agent's label does not affect the repartition of resources and thus of the utility. For instance, if we interchange the actions of player 1 and 2, z 1 is transformed into z 3 ¼ ððr 2 ; r 1 ; r 1 Þ; ð1; 0; 0ÞÞ. There is always one player with utility 1 and two players with utility 0. Because of the two previous symmetries, we observed that the process is going to evolve similarly from states with the same ordered repartition of agents among resources, into states with another similar ordered repartition of agents per resources.
These two invariances have led us to represent any RC with the ordered repartition of players over resources. For any action vector a, we build the repartition vector of players over resources d :
is the number of players that use a resource r i 2 N . For instance, the repartition of player in z 1 is d 1 ¼ ð2; 1; 0Þ and the repartition vector of z 2 is d 2 ¼ ð1; 0; 2Þ. The ordered repartition vector is s ¼ ðs 1 ; . . . ; s N Þ where 8i; j 2 ½1; N, i < j,
For instance, the ordered repartition vector of z 1 is s 1 ¼ ð2; 1; 0Þ and, the ordered repartition of z 2 is s 2 ¼ ð2; 1; 0Þ which is equal to s 1 . Thus, it follows that this representation makes no difference between RC that are invariant with respect to the transformations mentioned above. Hence, it is possible to reduce the number of RC in X. Moreover, the utility vector repartition is directly specified by the ordered repartition of players, then we drop this notation and z ¼ ð a; uÞ becomes z ¼ s. In what follows, for ease of comprehension we slightly modify the RC notations. For each z 2 R the number of resources employed is denoted by n ¼ P N '¼1 1 s ' > 0 f g . In addition, for each n 2 ½1; N there exists different possible ordered repartitions of players whose number is denoted by I N ðnÞ. It is equal to the number of ways of partitioning integer N in n parts, i.e., I N ðnÞ ¼ PartðN; nÞ where the recursive formula gives PartðN; nÞ ¼ PartðN À 1; n À 1Þ þ PartðN À n; nÞ; and for any integers x, y, Partðx; xÞ ¼ 1, Partðx < y; yÞ ¼ 0 and 
It is important to note that this reduction procedure seems similar to mean-field analysis techniques as we use symmetries to gather a huge number of states. However, there are also some differences between our method and mean field. In fact, from a game perspective, the mean-field game theory cannot be applied here since this requires that the number of players in the game is very high which is not the case in our scenario (the size of the game is small). From a state analysis perspective (i.e., by looking at the states of the Markov Chain), our method differs from mean field in some points. The idea of mean-field is to reduce the size of the problem by gathering a huge number of states interacting into an effective state whose effect is the average of all gathered states. Here, there exists RC gathered into the same RRC that do not interact. For instance, states z 1 ¼ ðr 1 ; r 1 ; r 3 Þ and z 3 ¼ ðr 3 ; r 2 ; r 3 Þ do not interact in the sense that the transition from z 1 to z 3 requires many intermediary states and action changes which means that the system cannot move from one state to the other easily. Then, it appears that while some RRC contain a huge number of RC, which is usually one of the requirements to use mean-field techniques (large state space), some of the RRC contain only a few number of states of the initial MC. For instance the RRC with all the agents on the same resource (e.g., z ¼ ðr 1 ; r 1 ; r 1 Þ with the ordered repartition (3, 0, 0)) contains a number of states equal to the number of channels which is not large. Therefore, depending on the RRC, the latter can gather a few or a large number of states. The dimension reduction is made by gathering the states that share the same ordered repartition no matter what is their number and their interactions. In that sense, the first step of the reduction bears some resemblance with the notion of lumpability in [15] more than with mean-field. However, the MC in our case is not lumpable to the partition we make because Theorem 6.3.2 in [15] is not verified. In fact, there exists partitions for which the probability to leave one of the states is not identical to the other states of the partition (e.g., see in the Appendices, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety. org/10.1109/TPDS.2020.2964256, this is the case of all probabilities with double conditions such as in (16)).
The first step of our method can be seen as a state-to-state equivalence [18] ( "Aggregation of Markov process"). We identify an equivalence relation between states of X such that it creates a partition of them. In the first step of the process we describe a subset of this partition, the RRC. To complete the approximation, in the second step of the procedure described afterwards, we increase this subset by adding other sets of X's states into the partition.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that the social welfares of the RC represented by the same RRC are equal because they have the same ordered repartition vector and hence, the same repartition of the utility values. However, the repartition cannot be made based on the social welfare. In fact, this is not a sufficient condition to specify if two states belong to the same RRC as we can find states that belong to different RRC and that have the same social welfare. For instance, one can consider the two RRC represented by the ordered repartitions [4, 0, 0, 0] and [2, 2, 0, 0]. Both of them lead to states with a null social welfare because all agents are subject to interference in each case.
APPROXIMATED MARKOV CHAIN
In this section, we build an approximation e X of X that is composed of the RRC states and other intermediary states between the RRC. More specifically, the construction of the intermediary states considered in each approximation (of TEL and ODL) is detailed. The RRC are a subset of a partition (that we note P in the sequel) of X. The intermediary states that we add in this second step of the procedure are also sets of the partition P that are different from the RRC. The reason to complete the model with the intermediary states is twofold. First, to be able to realize the computation of the figures of merit defined in Section 2.3, we need to link the RRC so as to use the theoretical tools in Section 4. Second, if more states are included in partition P, the approximation becomes more accurate. Therefore, the accuracy of the approximation increases as more states in the partition P are considered, which explains why we add intermediary states. It follows that the MC e X considered to compute the performance metrics are an approximation of the initial MC for each algorithm as we cannot describe a complete partition P of X.
We propose a general scheme to construct the approximation based on the two following rules, i) the willingness to conserve the ergodic property of X in order to be able to approach its convergence performance, ii) the need to construct a Markov chain with low dimension (i.e., with the least number of states). A condition to make property i) realizable, consists in constructing intermediary states around each RRC such that, all states of e X (i.e., RRC and intermediary states) are accessible from one another. We note n ðiÞ the set that contains the RRC Z n ðiÞ and some associated intermediary states that we define later. The simplest and necessary way to conserve the ergodicity property, thus verifying ii), is to construct intermediary states such that, if the transition between sets n ðiÞˆ nþ1 ðjÞ exists then there also exists a transition from sets nþ1 ðjÞˆ n ðiÞ (the symbolˆspecifies that this transition can involve multiple states in e X). This is the consequence of the fact that from every RRC Z n ðiÞ where n < N, there are players interfered and, it is possible for one of them to find a free resource (e.g., an interfered player experiments on a free resource). Repeating this process successively shows that, all RRC can access Z N ð1Þ, which is the RRC without interference. Therefore, the condition, if n ðiÞˆ nþ1 ðjÞ exists, then, so does nþ1 ðjÞˆ n ðiÞ, implies that all sets communicate. Finally, the previous condition becomes sufficient, if the sets are constructed such that all states in all sets are accessible. In addition to these simplifications, we consider the following hypothesis to build e X completely.
Assumption 1.
For each algorithm model, we assume at each iteration of the algorithm that at most one content player can experiment, and such, solely when the system is in an all content mood and aligned state, i.e., m ¼ m C , u ¼ u and, a ¼ a.
The reason to propose this assumption is summarized as follows. When all players are content, the probability that one player experiments (i.e., 0 < ( 1) is larger than the probability that two or more players experiment (i.e., 0 < 2 ( ( 1). Moreover, when the system is not aligned, it goes in less than two steps and with a high probability (i.e., % ð1 À Þ 2 ) to a state in which all players are content and aligned or, that contains a discontent player. Thus, most of the time, the system is either in a) an all content and aligned state or, b) it contains at least one discontent player. In case a), it is more probable that only one player experiments whereas, in case b), the probability that a discontent player experiments is equal to 1 which is much larger than the probability for a content player to experiment ( ( 1). In other words, we suppose that the constants f 1 and f 2 in Section 2 have been chosen such that F ð:Þ spans the whole available region.
In the next two sections, we present the constructions of sets n ðiÞ of each algorithm. We start the reasoning by considering all sets n ðiÞ ¼ fZ n ðiÞg. Then we add successively intermediary states in all sets to build the approximated MC. When a state is added to n ðiÞ it is also added to any other set n 0 ði 0 Þ where i 6 ¼ i 0 and n 6 ¼ n 0 . Figs. 1a and 1b present, a resulting partial view of e X's intermediary models with two sets n ðiÞ and nþ1 ðjÞ for TEL and ODL respectively. The lines define the oriented connections between states. Plain lines correspond to direct transition inside the same set n ðiÞ whereas dashed lines correspond to direct transitions between different sets. The connexions are detailed in Appendices A and B, available in the online supplemental material, for TEL and ODL respectively. In these figures, without loss of generality, it is supposed that, there exists j such that n ðiÞ is connected to nþ1 ðjÞ. In such a case, we would also like to have nþ1 ðjÞ connected to n ðiÞ for ergodicity. We also suppose that, all intermediary states are present for simplicity of comprehension, whereas as explained in the next two sections, there exists some conditions in which they have to be deleted from their corresponding set to keep e X ergodic. More generally, the proposed method can be reused when dealing with resource allocation and decision algorithms based on regular perturbed MCs as illustrated by the application of the procedure to two TE algorithms in the next two subsections. Though, there are some specific aspects that must be verified to apply the aforementioned method. For instance, the transitions between the states and the symmetries in terms of resource permutations (as discussed above) must be verified. By using the aforementioned reduction method, one is able to describe the approximated MCs by providing the description of states and transitions involved between only two of the RRC states (see Figs. 1a and 1b) . During the implementation, one has just to specify the probabilities of transitions and the states involved in the sub-graph to replicate. This canonical form enables to describe the whole approximated chain (which also can comprise a large number of states).
TEL Model
This section presents the construction of the intermediary states in the approximated Markov chain based on the TEL algorithm described in Section 2.1. Given any RRC Z n ðiÞ, a transition where an interfered player finds a free resource, e.g., Z n ðiÞˆZ nþ1 ðjÞ, does not necessitate additional intermediary state unless one player is left alone on its resource after the experimentation. In this situation, the left alone player sees its utility increases and becomes hopeful. Therefore, we start by considering in n ðiÞ the state n 0 ðiÞ in addition to Z n ðiÞ where n 0 ðiÞ corresponds to a player alone in Z n ðiÞ that is hopeful. Thus, at this step, 8n; i, n ðiÞ ¼ fZ n ðiÞ; n 0 ðiÞg. A transition in which the network uses one less frequency, e.g., nþ1 ðjÞˆ n ðiÞ, involves a player that accepts a lower benchmark, which is only possible through a discontent mood. To become discontent, a player passes through a watchful mood. This leads us to consider the two intermediary states 
(where ! means that the transition is direct), the system is not aligned whereas, a content player experiments. It is not in accordance with Assumption 1 but, this is the only time that it is overrided in order to keep the chain ergodic. Finally, to avoid any absorbing state, two more intermediary states n 3 ðiÞ and n 4 ðiÞ are considered where n 3 ðiÞ is a state where two players that were alone in Z n ðiÞ are using the same resource and one of them is watchful. It corresponds to the case where the discontent player from n 2 ðiÞ has updated its benchmark with the resource of a player that was not interfered in Z n ðiÞ. n 4 ðiÞ is a state where two players that were alone in Z n ðiÞ are using the same resource and one of them is discontent. It corresponds to the state that follows These absences have to be taken into account, to compute the probabilities in Appendix A, available in the online supplemental material, and in the simulations in order to build an ergodic chain (an isolated state in a matrix makes the chain not ergodic). These cases are described as follows starting with any given n ðiÞ ¼ fZ n ðiÞg:
If in Z n ðiÞ all players are interfered, only the state Z n ðiÞ is present If in Z n ðiÞ one player is alone on its resource, this player can become discontent or hopeful, however, it cannot make an other player discontent. Therefore, include states 
ODL Model
This section presents the construction of the intermediary states in the Markov chain approximation based on the ODL algorithm described in Section 2.2. First of all, the model that contains only n ðiÞ ¼ fZ n ðiÞg is sufficient to have an ergodic chain e X. The transition Z n ðiÞ ! Z n ðiÞ occurs if nothing happens. The transition Z n ðiÞ ! Z nþ1 ðjÞ represents an interfered player that experiments and finds a free resource. The reversed transition Z nþ1 ðiÞ ! Z n ðjÞ occurs if one of the not interfered player in Z nþ1 ðjÞ goes back to the position of the experimenter from Z n ðiÞ. The accuracy of the model can be increased by adding few more states. The stability of ODL is directly related to the number of discontent players. Such players experiment randomly, which makes the number of possible transitions between states growing very fast with the number of discontent players. It prevents us from describing too many discontent players at the same iteration. In this work, we manage to model the case where at most two players can be discontent at the same time. Going beyond this would require for each additional discontent player a large amount of extra transitions for a small accuracy gain. This model requires three more states 
n ðiÞ. They have to be removed accordingly to make the resulting Markov chain ergodic. These cases are described as follows starting with n ðiÞ ¼ fZ n ðiÞg:
If there exists a resource played by two players in Z n ðiÞ, include the state n 3 ðiÞ in the set n ðiÞ. If at least one player in Z n ðiÞ is alone on its resource, include the state n 1 ðiÞ in n ðiÞ. If at least two players in Z n ðiÞ are alone on their respective resource, include n 2 ðiÞ in n ðiÞ. The transitions between states and the associated probabilities are detailed in Appendix B, available in the online supplemental material.
Complexity Comparison
We compute the MC complexities, to highlight the importance of the transformations from X to e X made in this work. The simplifications and approximations are essential in order to be able to predict the algorithm performance. The number of states in X is given by the product of component dimension of z ¼ ðm; a; a; u; uÞ. The vector of player moods can have M K values if the mood of each player can take M values. The vector of player actions and action benchmarks a or a can take N K values each one. The utility vector u is specified by the action vector a and, the utility benchmark vector u can take 2 K values. Therefore, the complexity of X is ðMN 2 2Þ K . This is obviously intractable and, we have reduced the recurrence states R into Z which has a cardinality jZj ¼ P K n¼1 PartðK; nÞ. Afterwards, we have approximated X by keeping some intermediary states as detailed in Section 6. Fig. 2 presents the complexity of X and e X for the TEL algorithm with respect to the number of players. The significant complexity reduction allows us to predict performance numerically.
Note that the complexity of e X is proportional to jZj which is the number of all the ways of partitioning integer K. In [19] , the following asymptotic approximation of P K n¼1 PartðK; nÞ has been obtained It follows that the asymptotic approximation of log ðj e XjÞ is given by
where C 1 is a positive constant. Relatively, the asymptotic complexity log ðjXjÞ given that N ¼ K is
This highlights the significant complexity reduction for large K.
PROCEDURE TO COMPUTE THE TRANSITION MATRIX
Once the states of e X are established, the next step consists in computing the transition probabilities of matrix P. The procedure is described in Algorithm 1 and summarized as follows. The first step necessitates to generate all RRCs. For this purpose, a classical integer partitioning algorithm is used to generate all ordered repartition vector S n ðiÞ [20] . The number of RRC using n 2 ½1; . . . ; N resources among N is given by I N ðnÞ (see Section 5) . In both algorithms, at each RRC Z n ðiÞ is associated an intermediary state model n ðiÞ, whose number of states depends on some exceptions specified in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 for TEL and ODL respectively. One has to pay attention to these exceptions when it makes the one-to-one mapping function between the states of e X and the rows of P. Then, Algorithm 1 goes through all Z n ðiÞ and looks for all j 2 I N ðn þ 1Þ such that Z nþ1 ðjÞ is accessible from Z n ðiÞ. When n < N, there exists at least one such a j and, by construction, the set nþ1 ðjÞ is connected to the set n ðiÞ. The transition probabilities are computed in the algorithm through three consecutive steps. These steps and formulas are highlighted in the same order in Appendices A and B, available in the online supplemental material, for TEL and ODL respectively. On the first hand, the probabilities inside the set n ðiÞ are computed. On the second and third hand, for each j in I N ðn þ 1Þ such that n ðiÞ is connected to nþ1 ðjÞ, the algorithm computes the probabilities from set n ðiÞ to set nþ1 ðjÞ and the reverse probabilities from set nþ1 ðjÞ to set n ðiÞ. The example provided in Fig. 3 with K ¼ N ¼ 5 highlights the links between the sets n ðiÞ, identified by the vector S n ðiÞ. For instance, the set in the top left corresponds to 5 players interfering on the same resource and, the set in the top right corresponds to the set without interference. Compute the following probabilities using Appendices A and B, available in the online supplemental material, for TEL and ODL respectively (check the existence of links using exceptions from Sections 6.1 and 6.2), and fill the matrix P:
and, N ¼ K þ 2. In the ODL, the constant c is equal to K. Both algorithms are compared with respect to the same probability to experiment from a content mood, i.e., in TEL is equal to c in ODL. The EFHT t ij is computed from, the state i where all players are on the same resource (e.g., state with S 1 ð1Þ ¼ ð5; 0; 0; 0; 0Þ in Fig. 3) , to the state j where they are all on different resources (e.g., state with S 5 ð1Þ ¼ ð1; 1; 1; 1; 1Þ in Fig. 3 ). The stability a is computed for the state j where all players use a different resource. In Monte Carlo simulations we use 5,000 trials to compute t ij and 10 6 trials to compute a. In that case, we have noticed that the standard deviation of the EFHT and of the stability are very small with respect to the value of the metric. For instance, in the case of TEL with N ¼ K ¼ 7 and ¼ 10 À3 (see Fig. 4a ), the value of the EFHT is around 5,000 whereas the standard deviation is 41 (a similar observation about the ratio between the metric and its standard deviation is made for the stability metric).
For the TEL algorithm, Figs. 4a and 4b present the EFHT and the fraction of time 1 À a when K ¼ N respectively. The reason to display 1 À a instead of a is to discern the values close to one at low . For both features, these results are accurate in comparison to Monte Carlo simulations. The EFHT converges to the Monte Carlo results when decreases. The little gap observed at higher is caused by an increasing probability to have more than one experiment at a time. Thus, the probability for the system to not be aligned increases and, Assumption 1 is less valid. The offset observed in Fig. 4b is due to the fact that, we are able to represent accurately at most one discontent player at each algorithm iteration. The stability is highly related to the number of discontent players.
Figs. 5a and 5b present the same results but with
The goal is to show the coherence of our approximation. In that scenario, two resources have been added which results in the decrease of the collision probability. Therefore, with respect to the first scenario, Assumption 1 is more accurate and, the probability of being discontent decreases. Consequently, the numerical results of our approximation are closer to Monte Carlo simulations.
In addition, in Figs. 4 and 5, one can observe that log ðT EFHT Þ are straight decreasing lines with respect to logðÞ which sustains the result made in Observation 1, in which the behaviour of EFHT is T EFHT ¼ Oð For the ODL algorithm, Figs. 6a and 6b present, when K ¼ N, the EFHT and the fraction of time a, respectively. For both features, these results are accurate in comparison to Monte Carlo simulations. The gap observed at low for the stability metric is due to the number of discontent players. We recall that the proposed approximation models accurately at most two discontent players. When decreases the number of discontent players increases (a player remains in D with probability 1 À when u ¼ 0) above two with an increasing probability and the model is less accurate.
We present in Figs. 7a and 7b the same results but with N ¼ K þ 2. The accuracy of both features studied is again assessed. The probability to have collisions (interferences) decreases and so does the probability to have a high number of discontent players. This leads to a better accuracy of the proposed model. Generally, one can notice how the stability decreases with the number of players and how the convergence time increases. Furthermore, the convergence time decreases when the number of resources increases.
The results in Figs. 6 and 7 sustain Observation 2 as we will explain hereinafter. One can check that the logarithm of the EFHT are decreasing straight lines with respect to log ð c Þ hence, T EFHT ¼ Oð
Þ where b 2 > 0. Furthermore, we observe that log ð1 À aÞ are increasing lines, which leads us to describe the behaviour of the stability as 1 À a ¼ Oð cb 4 Þ where b 4 > 0.
Performance Comparisons With Approximation in the Literature
In this section, we compare the results obtained in the previous section with the approximation given in paper [9] , noted model 1 in this work. The figures of merit are computed in this last model as follows. For the EFHT, the Equation (33) in [9] is employed. For the stability, Theorem 5 in [9] gives the stability a j but some minor corrections have been made. For instance, the term T CNE ðkÞ from [9] is replaced with Equation (33) [9] whose sum is started in k instead of 0. The reason for this change is that the variable T CNE ðkÞ diverges when N ¼ K and, it is an upper bound of (33) [9] .
Figs. 8a and 9a present the EFHT of the models e X and 1 when N ¼ K and K þ 2, respectively. One can observe that there is a substantial improvement by using our model except for high where the gap between the two models is small. Our model is therefore more accurate and provides results closer to those obtained by simulations. On the other hand, Figs. 8b and 9b present 1 À a j when N ¼ K and K þ 2 respectively. One can notice that, except for K ¼ 3, the curves resulting from model 1 are above those of model e X. As our model is a tight upper bound on Monte Carlo simulation (see Figs. 4b and 5b) , it again assesses the accuracy of our model.
For the stability metric, in the case N ¼ 3 and K ¼ N, the model 1 is as closed to Monte Carlo simulations as our proposed approximation. However, contrarily to model e X, the result for N ¼ K þ 2 shows that model 1 gets away from the simulation. This proves the coherence of our model in comparison to model 1.
Performance Comparison Between TEL and ODL
In the previous subsections, we have characterized the accuracy of the TEL and ODL proposed models. In this subsection, we take the advantage of the available approximations that have low complexity, to compare both algorithms and, to analyze their performance in domains hardly reachable with Monte Carlo simulations. Figs. 10a and 10b present, for both algorithms, the EFHT (in log scale) and the stability a j respectively. The number of resources used is N ¼ K and N ¼ K þ 5 and, the probability to experiment is fixed to ¼ c ¼ 10 À3 . The increase of N results for both algorithms, first, in a better stability and, second, in a lower convergence time. This result counteracts the argument that the convergence time increases with the alphabet size ([9] Section 5.2.). The reason is that players find a free interference state faster and, the probability that two players collide is smaller when the set of free resources is bigger. There exists a value of K such that the EFHT for both algorithms is the same. Below this value, ODL is more efficient than TEL with respect to the convergence time, and beyond this value the behaviour is inverted. More generally, the fact that in some cases TEL converges faster than ODL contradicts the idea that, the bigger the algorithm controller is (4 moods for TEL and 2 moods for ODL), the slower the convergence is, as mentioned in [10] (Section 4.2). In addition, Fig. 10b shows that TEL is much more stable than ODL even when N is increased and such, for any K. Fig. 11 presents the same results as in Fig. 10 but with ¼ c ¼ 10 À4 . The convergence time of both algorithms are increased. This is not a surprise as we deduce in Observation 1 that
. The decrease of increases the stability of both algorithms. As decreases, the number of experiments from players in mood C decreases. Thus, the probability that two players or more collide also decreases with which results in a higher stability of the state. More generally, the convergence and stability tendencies remain the same in comparison to Fig. 10 . In Figs. 10a and 11a , one can assess the results made in Observations 1 and 2 about the behaviour of the EFHT with respect to K for both algorithms. More specifically, in the case of TEL, we observe that the logarithm values of the EFHT are close to increasing straight lines so log ðT EFHT Þ ¼ O gK ð Þ where g > 0. In addition, in the case of ODL, the behaviour of log ðT EFHT Þ is not linear but rather polynomial so log ðT EFHT Þ ¼ OðK b Þ where b > 1. Then, we observe in Figs. 10b and 11b that the behaviour of the stability differs largely between TEL and ODL. In order to specify them, we display the stability in two different ways in Fig. 12 for TEL and ODL respectively. More specifically, in the case of TEL, the Fig. 12a shows that log ð1 À aÞ are increasing straight lines with respect to log ðKÞ and hence 1 À a ¼ OðK g Þ with g > 0.
In Fig. 12b , one can observe that the values of logðaÞ are decreasing lines with respect to K at large K. It follows that a ¼ Oðb K Þ with 0 < b < 1.
To conclude, in our system model, ODL is less stable than TEL. There exists some region of K for which ODL converges faster. However, the gain in speed convergence is not considerable and, the convergence time increase of ODL with respect to K makes the convergence of this algorithm possibly very long in large systems. This small advantage in convergence speed is compromised by less stability. In view of the results, we would recommend that, the use of the ODL algorithm in an environment with a hard threshold utility model is preferable when the need in stability is not important and the amount of players is limited.
CONCLUSION
This work provides a detailed performance analysis of well known model-free learning strategies, TEL and ODL, that converge in a broad class of games. To overcome the huge dimension of the inherent Markov chains of the game, we provide an approximation of these chains. This allows computing a close approximation of the average time the system stays in a desired state as well as the average time required to achieved that state for the first time. Thanks to the above approximations, a comparison between the performance of TEL and ODL is provided. His research interests include radio access design with cross-layer optimization for ad hoc mobile networks and cognitive radio. These topics cover multi-user access, radio resource allocation, HARQ, dynamic spectrum management, distributed resource allocation, network clustering, and high-fidelity simulations. He is a senior member of the IEEE. 
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